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Conservatism is now often said to be a disposition. Against definitions of
conservatism as a disposition, critics say that it is also an ideology, and against any
such abstract definitions, that it is a historical entity. But no one has yet
indicated how these criticisms can be used to improve the definition of conservatism.
Here I argue that the dispositional understanding of conservatism, while not
wrong in itself, is only the first and simplest element in what has to be an extended
or dialectical definition of conservatism. This article is a statement of such
a definition.
1.
In this paper I want to offer a philosophical argument which will
delineate the nature of conservatism. This argument will not be
minimal, or analytical, in form: for I think such an argument
would do an injustice to what is, in the end, a political disposition,
a political movement, a political ideology. It will be an argument
that attempts to do some justice not only to the history of conserva-
tism but also to the contradictions in the meaning of conservatism.
The argument will begin in the next section, after I make some pre-
liminary comments in this section about the current state of thinking
on the subject.
Most writers who write about conservatism – historians, journal-
ists, political scientists – simply collect instances of it, and refuse to
think further. But recently there has been a revival of something
more ambitious. Martin Beckstein has recently argued that it is pos-
sible to find a principle that unites all forms of conservatism. In
saying this, he is returning to, and attempting to clarify, Michael
Oakeshott’s famous definition of conservatism from the 1950s.
Beckstein’s claim, in short, is that conservatism is, as Oakeshott
claimed it was, the disposition to hold onto the status quo: with the
important qualification, introduced by Beckstein, that it is not
enough to defend the status quo unconsciously or accidentally: one
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must do so out of some definite conviction that the status quo should
be defended.1
Being truly conservative means to aim for the conservation of es-
tablished institutions out of conviction and not happenstance; it
means to have a presumption in favour of the given rather than a
presumption in disfavour of the untried; to attach a value to the
status quo because it is the status quo rather than disvalue
change because it is change; and to act on an imperative of pres-
ervation because the desirability of continuity is supposed, not
because the utility of innovation is doubted.
This is a meaningful distinction in theory, but really one must
wonder whether it has much significance in practice. Could we ever
distinguish the two? Surely under criticism the negative conservatism
would soon become a positive conservatism. For instance, I might
not want to admit change out of a basic fear of change; but if
someone were to ask me to explain, as would be likely in a political
situation, why anyone else should take my view seriously, I would
have to do a bit of work to come up with something a bit more per-
suasive about why change would not be a good idea and why resisting
change should be taken up by others. Then I would be a conservative
in Beckstein’s sense. So perhaps Beckstein’s refinement of Oakeshott
is too fine. But that is a matter of nuance. There is a far more forceful
objection to Beckstein’s argument. Joseph Femia points to this in his
critical reply to Beckstein’s article. While admitting that Beckstein
may have captured something in the nature of conservatism, Femia
comments that Beckstein has failed to show why we should think
there is any relation between having a ‘conservative disposition’
and having a ‘conservative ideology’.2 There are four varieties of con-
servatism sketched here by Beckstein and Femia. Let me try to make
their positions clear by referring to four formal claims which we
might consider conservative. Beckstein says that anyone who says
the following might be conservative in some sense but is not a ‘true
conservative’:
A: ‘I want to hold onto the status quo because I fear change.’
To be a true conservative, according to Beckstein, a true conservative
has to say the following:
1 Martin Beckstein, ‘What Does It Take to be a True Conservative?’,
Global Discourse 5 (2015), 4–21.
2 Joseph V. Femia, ‘Identifying True Conservatives: A Reply to
Beckstein’, Global Discourse 5 (2015), 22–23.
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B: ‘I want to hold onto the status quo out of a positive conviction
about its value.’
Femia disagrees with Beckstein because he thinks more has to be said
about what this ‘positive conviction’ is. The two following claims are
versions of B, but Femia in effect suggests that we have to distinguish
them. For Femia, anyone who said the following would not be a
conservative:
C: ‘I want to hold onto the status quo out of a positive conviction
about the value of the status quowhich, by theway, is, in this case,
a socialist conviction.’
For Beckstein, such a claim would be that of a ‘true conservative’.
Doubtless, anyone who were to say C would have a conservative dis-
position of some sort; but having a conservative justification for it
would be another thing entirely. A conservative policy or ideology
is lacking. For Femia, B could only be a conservative claim in a
meaningful political sense if something further were said to avoid
saying C. Therefore:
D: ‘I want to hold onto the status quo out of a positive conviction
about its value, and this, by the way, is a distinctively conserva-
tive conviction, thereby making me conservative and not some-
thing else.’
Femia makes an important criticism here. In fact, he points to the
problem of all problems in understanding conservatism. This is
‘What makes a conviction a distinctively conservative conviction?’
I think this is a genuine conundrum. I also think that theories of
the sort proposed by Beckstein are of interest because they set the
problem to one side in order to achieve something like philosophical
clarity about conservatism.My own view is that serious consideration
of conservatism must abandon such exact philosophical clarity – in
the sense of a minimal or analytical clarity which does not do
justice to the difficulties of the subject. By this I do not mean we
should abandon argument, but that we should attempt to recognise
the significance of historical realities for the subject as well as the sig-
nificance of philosophical clarity. Femia has shown where the diffi-
culty lies with a one-sided philosophical view. But no one has yet
suggested how the difficulty can be overcome. In this paper I shall
argue that Beckstein’s, or Oakeshott’s, type of theory cannot be
taken to be an entire theory of conservatism. It can only be considered
an element of such a theory: a part of such a theory but not the whole;
in fact, no more than the first moment of a dialectical definition of
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conservatism. It is only if we discover such a definition of conserva-
tism that the difficulty can be overcome.
A few years ago I wrote an article, ‘The Contradictions of
Conservatism’, in which I worked through what some of the
most suggestive writers in the last century or so had said about con-
servatism.3 In that article I attempted a full characterisation of con-
servatism, even to the extent of recognising its contradictions. I
cited all the major works written on the subject in order to do full
justice to them. Perhaps the style or even the title of that article ob-
scured the argument. So here I try again. In this article I shall
proceed through my own argument rather than through quotation
of other people’s arguments. I shall also try to state the argument
clearly so it cannot be misunderstood.
2.
Let me begin with an initial hypothesis. This is the hypothesis that:
Conservatism is holding onto what we have.
The dictionary on my computer says:
ORIGIN lateMiddle English: fromOld French conserver (verb),
conserve (noun), from Latin conservare ‘to preserve,’ from con-
‘together’+ servare ‘to keep.’
So in its simplest, or original, meaning, ‘to conserve’ is to keep
together or hold onto what one has. In politics ‘conservatism’ is the
politics of standing fast and holding fast, of having and holding. It
is the politics of inertia, not the politics of acceleration: and I
choose the word inertia carefully, since conservatism is not about
entirely resisting change: an object subject to inertia can be moving
uniformly, and can be acted on by other forces.
But conservatism is not only this. And to say it is only this is an
error.
This is the error Oakeshott made in his influential article, ‘On
Being Conservative’.4 It is likely that any discussion of conservatism
will have to refer to Oakeshott for some time: for it seems to have
3 James Alexander, ‘The Contradictions of Conservatism’, Government
and Opposition 48 (2013), 594–616.
4 Michael Oakeshott, ‘On Being Conservative’ (1956), in Michael




become the starting point of much current writing on the subject.
I think Oakeshott’s argument is brilliant, and not a little sly. It is
remarkably persuasive: in my experience even students inclined to
the progressive side of politics find it persuasive. His argument is
that conservatism is only holding onto what we have: the implication
being that ‘what we have’ is limited to what we have now, in the
present. He says that conservatism is a disposition, an attitude held
in the present about what is good and what is bad, and which says
that what is good is holding into what we have at present. The
problem with this is not that it is wrong, but that it would be
wrong to think that this could exhaust the meaning of conservatism.
Conservatism is more than this. The argument depends on a trick.
Firstly, Oakeshott excludes from his definition anything which is
not only holding onto what we have got. Secondly, and this is his par-
ticular sleight of hand, he denies that conservatism can be anything
more than a disposition. In saying this, ironically, he detaches conser-
vatism from all history: from the Conservative party, from Burke,
Coleridge, Peel, Disraeli, Maine, Salisbury etc. It is not an ideology,
it is not even a tradition, it is nothing to do with revolution, it has
nothing to do with Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution of France.
Note this surprising judgement. Nothing to do with Burke, ‘the
father of conservatism’.
Of course, we are well aware that that the word ‘conservatism’ no
more existed in 1790 than the word ‘liberalism’ did in 1690. In a
strict historical sense Burke was not conservative, just as Locke,
‘the father of liberalism’, was not liberal. But this is not Oakeshott’s
point. He is not saying Burke is not conservative because he is too
early, but, rather, that he is not the right sort of conservative
because he is too late. Oakeshott goes back beyond Burke to the
calm of the eighteenth century before the French Revolution. He
says: ‘It would perhaps have been more fortunate if modern conser-
vatives had paidmore attention toHume and less to Burke’.5 The sig-
nificance of this for his argument cannot be underestimated.
Oakeshott not only leaves behind the century, the nineteenth, in
which conservatism was named and formed into a party; he also
leaves behind Burke and the revolution which provoked him to
write the work which is still supposed to be the original work of con-
servatism. In this way Oakeshott does something very interesting for
a philosopher who, as a good Cantabrigian, was so concerned with
5 Michael Oakeshott, ‘Review of Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind
(1954)’, in Luke O’Sullivan (ed.), The Vocabulary of a Modern European
State (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008), 81–4, at 83.
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history: he abstracts conservatism from history altogether. He retreats
his conservatism to the time of Hume and assumes that it can be
called a ‘disposition’: a civilised, polite disposition to which no one
could possibly take exception. But to do so is a mistake.
Or, rather, it is a mistake if we believe that Oakeshott has exhausted
the subject and succeeded in telling us what conservatism is. I think
that the correct way to deal with Oakeshott’s argument is to say – as
F.R. Leavis always used to say – ‘Yes, but…’. Oakeshott is quite
right as far as he goes, but he does not go very far. He tells us what
conservatism is only in the simplest sense. He offers a model for
what we could consider conservatism to be, if we were happy to
strip back its meaning to some sort of eighteenth-century disposition.
But it is not an eighteenth-century disposition; or, it is not only that:
it is also a nineteenth-century party and a twentieth-century
ideology.
Conservatism is holding onto what we have.
Yes, but –
So how to continue?
3.
Well, we have to recognise that we cannot simply have a model of
some sort of timeless conservatism. This is possible, but it leaves us
with not very much (only ‘conservatism is holding onto what we
have’), and, ironically, it leaves out the very consciousness of histor-
ical situation which seems to have been responsible for consciousness
of conservatism in the first place. This is unsatisfactory.
What I will argue here, then, is that we have to refine the definition
by adding some historical features to it. In short, I will continue by
exploring a qualified version of the hypothesis, where the hypothesis
is qualified by a historical fact:
Conservatism is holding onto what we have,
where what we have is of the past as well as of the present,
in a historical situation in which there has been a rupture with the
past,
and where the rupture has involved the arrival of rational, secular
ideals.
Let me deal with each of these qualifying remarks one by one.
‘…where what we have is of the past as well as of the present…’ It is a
simple matter to see why this is necessary. In short, it is because we
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live in literate cultures. So that traditions are not simply what exists in
the rituals and practices we live by now, which can be handed over
from one generation to the next, and which are only as long-lived
as the oldest living member of a community. That would be the
case in a culture without script. On the contrary, traditions are funda-
mentally altered by the fact that we have canons of literature in rela-
tion towhichwe canmake our own critical and creative contributions,
and by the fact that it is possible to set the truth – if we ever receive the
truth – in stone, write it down for all time: in other words to have
authoritative or apostolic texts, such as the Vedas, the Torah, the
Dhammapada, the Bhagavad-gita, the Tao-te-Ching, the Gospels,
the Qur’an, and so on. A canon is something which develops, as
Newman famously argued in the nineteenth century; while the
truth is the truth, one supposes, for all time, and does not develop,
but cuts through history, as if from eternity.6
So ‘what we have’ is not simply this ritual, this poem, this song,
this woman, this land, these animals, this house, it is also this litera-
ture, and through this literature, we have, in some sense, access to the
rituals, poems, songs, women, lands, animals, houses of the past, and
also access to the truths or insights which our ancestors were fortunate
to receive. ‘What we have’ is not a simple thing, to which we can have
a complacent Oakeshottian cottage conservatism attitude. What we
have is manifold: indeed, contradictory. It involves canons which
carry with them a perpetual possibility of criticism of what is had
and held now, and, perhaps, involves truths which put every
passing situation or belief to the question.
This might not matter very much, in itself, but it is a very signifi-
cant fact, a historical fact, which Oakeshott ignores. And the signifi-
cance of this fact is intensified when whatever we have from the past is
seen to be in conflict with what we have in the present.
‘…in a historical situation in which there has been a rupture with the
past…’ If the first qualification suggests that any conservatism in-
volves a consciousness of history, of some past, then this second
one is more decisive: it suggests that conservatism is not only con-
scious of history but emerges at a particular point in history when
the past becomes suddenly far more valuable than it was before, for
the reason that there has been some rupture with the past. The past
is, in one sense, lost: we have lost our continuity, our traditions,
our beliefs, our rituals. Instead of them we have adopted others.
6 For an elucidation of this rather abridged argument, see James
Alexander, ‘A Systematic Theory of Tradition’, forthcoming in Journal of
the Philosophy of History.
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And so here the conservative is someonewho says, ‘Although we have
in one sense lost the past, in another sense we still have it, because of
our literary remains, and perhaps also our memories: and we have a
duty to recover some element of that past: for the rupture was a
mistake.’ Is this clear? Conservatism, at this stage, is a consciousness
not only of the past in so far as it relates to the present, but the past as
it forms a contrast with the present, because, for some reason or other
– which we could call revolution – the present has become severed
from the past. Continuity has been severed. This rupture might be
any break with the past. But in our history, and, it is important to
add, in the only history in which the term ‘conservatism’ has any
meaning, this rupture is a distinctive one, one which is historically
locatable. It is the rupture which, however we conceive it, took
place in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The rupture
was a rupture in consciousness, which is why it did not take place
at one exact moment (though we can find symbols for it: for instance,
in the fall of Bastille). And this brings us to the third qualification.
‘…and where the rupture has involved the arrival of rational, secular
ideals…’ The decisive rupture is revolution, and not any revolution,
but in particular the ‘revolution’ of which the French Revolution is
the chief example. By this we mean a revolution which was harnessed
to enlightened ideals. This revolution may occur in a moment, in
which case we usually call it a revolution. But the revolution is no
less decisive when it takes place gradually over a century, or many
centuries, as it did in Britain, where it is usually given some other
gentler name, like ‘reform’. By revolution I do not mean just any
change in an order. It is not simply a rupture by which one set of
rituals or traditions replaces another set. It is not, for instance, the
rupture by which the Roman republic became the Roman empire.
Ronald Syme wrote a book in the 1930s entitled The Roman
Revolution about that rupture.7 His book had an eye-catching title,
but a misleading one. Syme was, like Oakeshott, engaging in a bit
of trickery: he was, firstly, mocking Augustus – whom he rather
impertinently called ‘Octavian’ throughout the book (though it was
only his name for a short time: even J.B. Bury, half a century
before, had more correctly called him ‘Caesar’) – for claiming to
have restored the republic. This was a reasonable point: Augustus,
or his poets, lawyers and historians, did claim that Augustus had re-
stored the republic. But Syme alsowas, with a very dark irony indeed,
using the modern term ‘revolution’ to suggest that Augustus was a




sort of Robespierre or Napoleon, which was far from being the case.
Yet Augustus only had themos maiorum to go by: the religion and law
and customs of Rome. Whereas everyone who was involved in the
French Revolution was justifying their actions by abstract principles,
enlightened ideals.
So at this stage – and I hope it is clear that this is a logical stage, and
not a historical stage – the conservative is not simply conscious of
some lost tradition. This is not Cicero writing in defence of the
republic. Here the conservative is not writing for the sake of a particu-
lar tradition, but is writing on behalf of tradition in its entirety, for
any tradition and all tradition. This is for the reason that the conser-
vative is he who is aware that the enlightened ideals by which modern
revolution was carried out are abstract. So here conservatism is
opposed to ideals and abstractions, and has to find arguments by
which he can defend not only particular traditions against these
ideals and abstractions but also – and this is very interesting, and
perhaps paradoxical – arguments by which he can defend tradition
in the abstract against these ideals and abstractions. He is forced even-
tually into the very paradoxical game ofmaking tradition into an ideal
and abstraction so he can defend it against the ideals and abstractions
which are wholly opposed to all or any traditions.
4.
Let me state the contradiction of conservatism immediately, since
everything I say subsequently will be affected by it, and it is better
it is understood at once rather than any misunderstanding be encour-
aged about where the argument is headed. The contradiction is:
Conservatism involves an acceptance of the rupture;
but it also involves a denial of the rupture.
‘Conservatism involves an acceptance of the rupture…’Conservatism is
not only reactionary, or counter-revolutionary; it accepts the condi-
tions which have been established since the revolution or the
gradual reforms by which enlightened, secular, rational, ideals have
been accepted as the criteria by which political acts ought to be justi-
fied. In England, the rise of the Conservative Party in the 1830s and
1840s was only possible once the ToryUltras orDie-Hards – themen
who wanted to overturn the Great Reform Act of 1832 – were ex-
cluded. Ever since Peel, as one commentator put it, not without
some irony, the conservatism of the Conservative Party has involved
the view ‘that the highest virtue in politics is to resist change until
223
A Dialectical Definition of Conservatism
change becomes inevitable, and then to concede to it with as little fuss
and as much obeisance to tradition as possible’.8 If we agreewith this,
and only this, then we have the conservatism of Oakeshott which we
could well call status quo conservatism, the conservatism of simply
holding onto what we have, while conceding whatever changes are
necessary. But, as should have been clear from the beginning of
this argument, I do not think this is only what conservatism is.
‘…but it also involves a denial of the rupture…’ Conservatism is not
simply Peel trying to hold the fort against Russell, while accepting
that the fort has been built in a new way. For even Peel’s politics
came out of the ‘unreformed’ era. There is an old order which was
worth defending, and even though it had to be surrendered as a prac-
ticable object of political activity, for the sake of the law and order
which the conservative of course values, it remains a structuring set
of ideals for the conservative. These ideals are, since they can be
listed in any particular case – as an Englishman, I write about the
English case – the ideals of monarchy and aristocracy, of institutions
which bring the community into a tradition hierarchy, institutions
such as the Crown, the Lords, the Commons, the Law Courts, the
Church, the Universities. (The institutions would be different in a
different case. But the principles would be the same, or, at least,
within reach of anthropological generalisation.) The ideal of the con-
servative remains hierarchical, whereas the ideals of the liberals and
socialists are egalitarian. The conservative both thinks that hierarch-
ies will survive in any order, including especially the ostentatiously
egalitarian orders of liberals and socialists, but also thinks that hier-
archies are better able to fulfil their necessary functions in a society
which recognises, maintains and to some extent rewards them
through ritual, title and symbol rather than simply through wealth.
This is because the rewards of ritual, title and symbol are restraints
as well as rewards. The conservatives in England are the defenders
of the mores maiorum of the English. This sort of conservatism is
counter-revolutionary conservatism.
This ambivalence runs throughout conservatism. It accepts the
rupture, and does not attempt to overturn it; yet it is committed to
the ideals – the only ideals it has – of an uninterrupted, an unover-
turned world, and so, vestigially, and perhaps only imaginatively,
and possibly only unconsciously, holds onto the ideal of overturning
the established order for the sake of return to an older one. I shall
explain this at greater length by taking the two sides of conservatism
8 T.E. Utley, A Tory Seer: The Selected Journalism of T.E. Utley,
eds C. Moore and S. Heffer (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989), 87.
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in turn: first, the side which accepts the rupture, and secondly, the
side which does not.
5.
Let me summarise:
Conservatism is holding onto what we have,
where what we have is of the past as well as of the present,
in a historical situation in which there has been a rupture with the
past,
and where the rupture has involved the arrival of rational, secular
ideals.
Conservatism involves an acceptance of the rupture;
but it also involves a denial of the rupture.
Now I want to consider the acceptance of the rupture separately. It is
at this point that we have to discuss conservatism – the conservatism
which was for the first time called ‘conservatism’ – in relation to the
other political creeds which were spawned by enlightenment and
revolution and which, by the 1840s, were fairly clearly defined.
These were political creeds which deliberately embraced secularism
and rationalism: these were liberalism and socialism.
There is a very simple point to make about this:
Conservatism accepts the rupture, and therefore tacitly accepts the
enlightened ideals which justified the rupture; however, in its prac-
tical politics, it attempts to hold onto as much of the status quo as
possible, and this means opposing the parties which are in favour
of a politics carried out in terms of the same enlightened ideals and
which in the name of those ideals favour further reform or revolution.
It is here that conservatism is not simply a matter of ‘holding onto
what we have’: it means opposing any politics which threaten the
status quo by bringing abstract ideals to bear on it. I do not want to
go too far into these ideals, but it should be obvious that I am refer-
ring to the ideals of the enlightenment: theLiberté, Égalité, Fraternité
of the French, the Rights of Man of Paine, the Utilitarian Calculus of
Bentham etc, and, later, the complicated historical versions of enligh-
tened ideals which began to flourish at the time of Mill and Marx.
These were concerned with history to some extent, but they were
not conservative: they were influenced by the Scottish economists
and historians, and thought that some understanding of history was
necessary in order to understand what would happen in the future.
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Partly this self-consciousness amongst liberals and socialists was a
consequence of doubts about revolution. Marx certainly took it as
his task to explain why the French Revolution had not changed the
world forever. But neither Mill nor Marx wanted to hold onto the
status quo or, even worse, try to go backwards.
Now, there is something to say about this. Conservatism, here,
accepts the rupture. This has a consequence. It means that its politics
must always be carried out according to the assumptions of the order
which follows the rupture. In other words, if the order is enlightened,
secular and rational, then in order to contribute to politics, conserva-
tismmust also be enlightened, secular and rational. Thismeans that it
must accept the language of its enemies to some extent: though this
does not mean it must accept their ideals. There is no need to
believe in enlightened ideals, but whatever they do believe in can
only be expressed politically if it is asserted in terms of those enligh-
tened ideals, since it is a condition of being allowed to take place in
modern politics that assertion is in terms of enlightened ideals.
There is, therefore, on this side, a likelihood that conservatism will
become entirely enlightened. The more the conservative assumes
that he is committed tomaintaining the status quo andmaking conces-
sions only where necessary, and the more the status quo is adjusted by
the more progressive parties in accordance with their enlightened
ideals, the more the conservative will attempt to conserve an enligh-
tened order. At this stage, conservatismwill be nothing other than the
politics of inertia, the politics of resistance followed soon after by the
politics of reluctant concession. And then the old joke that the conser-
vative holds onto to the liberal or socialists reforms of a previous gen-
eration will be true. This is the conjectural fate of the status quo
conservative. But, of course, my argument is that the status quo con-
servative is an Oakeshottian cardboard cut-out. Such figures do exist,
and the Conservative Party may be full of them (no doubt compli-
cated by other bits of enlightened ideals which make even
Conservatives think they should now reform actively), but they are
operating with a rather empty and one-sided idea of conservatism.
Let me state the complication, however.
This means that conservatism may become enlightened in conserving
a status quo which is itself built out of the enlightened ideals of an
earlier generation of non-conservatives.
That is not all. For since, as I mentioned earlier, the conservative is
aware of the complication of history, the conservative may, in oppos-
ing the ostentatiously progressive reforms of other political parties,
return to the examples of politics from any time following the
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rupture. The conservative might then not be reactionary in attempt-
ing to overturn the system; but reactionary in a lesser sense, not a sys-
tematic reactionary but a reactionary of the detail, attempting to
reverse some enlightened politics of, say, to choose a still obvious
example, the welfare state. If the Conservative Party of 2015 were
to attempt to return the state to its position in 1939 – which is of
course impossible outside of a thought experiment – then it would,
in principle, not be an entire overturning of the modern political
system, but an overturning of one element of an enlightened politics
which was established subsequent to the system. It would be a reac-
tion within the frame of the rupture, rather than reaction against the
rupture and against the system the rupture established.
This is all very abstract, no doubt, this talk of ‘rupture’ and
‘system’. But I think this is unavoidable, since these ideas are latent
in the nature of conservatism. They structure the way conservatives
think, even when they think in terms of contradictions.
As I approach the other side of the contradiction, the denial of the
rupture, it is perhaps first worth alluding to a theory I developed else-
where while reflecting on the relations between liberalism, socialism
and conservatism.9 In short, I maintained that there is a dialectical
relation between these three ideologies. The argument was that we
can understand the major ideologies forming a circle, along with
the original unenlightened condition. Letme state this schematically:
First, therewas an unenlightened condition, of hierarchies, tradi-
tions, caprice, and much custom: for instance, what was
called the ancien régime in France.
Then there was a rupture. The rupture in France was chaotic and
it was a generation before the politics of the interrupted order
settled down. In our history, the only one we have, politics
settled down in the mid-nineteenth century with the forma-
tion of ideologies and parties or movements which were at-
tached to these ideologies. Things have changed a bit since
the nineteenth century, but when we are talking about the
original, or major, ideologies, this is irrelevant. The three
ideologies form a logical sequence:
Second, then, therewas liberalism, which opposed to all the trad-
ition and custom of the unenlightened order the requirement
that all politics should be justified solely in terms of the good
of the self, which was conceptualised for the first time as an
9 James Alexander, ‘TheMajor Ideologies of Liberalism, Socialism and
Conservatism’, Political Studies 63 (2015).
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autonomous individual.
Third, there was socialism, which added to the liberal require-
ment the further requirement that the self be seen as consti-
tuted by its role and relation to others in society, so requiring
the attention be paid not only to the legal status of the self but
also its economic status.
Fourth, there was conservatism, which added to the socialist
requirement the further requirement that the self be seen as
constituted not only by its social existence in the present but
also by its relation to those no longer living and those not yet
living, so existing in a historical nexus in which it was import-
ant not to sacrifice tradition for the sake of an abstract ideal.
The point that makes this scheme fully circular is that though
conservatism is here seen to be an intensification of the en-
lightened criterion for politics, it ends by gesturing at rever-
ence for the old unenlightened order. So the circle is, here at
least, complete.
This circle is of course nothing other than an experiment in thought:
that is to say, it is possible to arguewith it at almost every point. But it
is thinkable. It asks everyone to see that the ideologies are dialectically
related; and not only dialectically related to each other, but also to the
traditional order in which enlightened ideals were nothing but fanta-
sies, and where ideologies or movements or parties such as liberalism,
socialism and conservatism did not exist because they could not exist.
All the ideologies are founded on the first, liberal, principle, which is
that politics should be constructed or justified in terms of the equal
right of all persons to enjoy the same consideration, and, in particular,
consideration in the form of liberty: that is, consideration in the form
of a concession to the individual. Socialism and conservatism begin
here; though, out of necessity, they think the liberal makes a
mistake in stopping here: so they intensify and complicate the
criterion.
The merit of the circle is that it expresses clearly what I want to
express here: that conservatism is contradictory, or ambivalent. As
I put it earlier, conservatism accepts the rupture with tradition; it
also denies it. So now I consider the denial.
6.
When conservatism accepts the rupture, it is, in the first instance,
concerned with the status quo; but then it faces the parties advocating
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further applications of enlightened ideals, and has to oppose these, so it
then has to develop not only an effective way of arguing negatively
against these enlightened positions, but has to find positive ways of
doing so which do not contradict the enlightened nature of the entire
political order.This raisesmany practical problems, ofwhichmany ex-
amples canbe found in thehistoryofpolitics of the last onehundredand
fifty years in many different countries. If conservatism were only a
status quo party it would be an enlightened party. But what I am
arguing here – as should be obvious from the image of the circle in
the last section – is that conservatism is not entirely enlightened.
(And it is not entirely enlightened not simply because of inertia:
though, of course, as I have said, it is a blind resistance to enlightenment
at one stage of its dialectic.) It points back to an unenlightened politics.
It points back to before the rupture. It may not advocate return, but it
insists that what is of absolute value is to be found there and not here.
There is ‘before the revolution’ as opposed to here, ‘after the revolu-
tion’. What I have argued so far is that conservatism, in its simplest
form, is holding onto what one has. But it has followed a rupture –
and a rupture of a particular sort, founded on enlightened ideals. So,
in its second sense, it is holding onto what one has in a situation
where one has accepted the rupture, and the enlightened conditions es-
tablished by the rupture, but where one attempts to resist any further
extension of enlightened ideals over the body politic. This involves re-
sisting the parties of progress, and so involves forming a party – a
Conservative party by name or, if not by name, then by nature –
which has to use the techniques of modern politics, and perhaps even
use progressive language and policies at times to achieve its ends:
thus involving it in complications bywhich even the staunchest conser-
vativemight well be confused . But there is also a third stage, and this is
the stage at which the conservative returns to the roots of his tradition
(or, we might say, his imagined tradition): roots which grew before
the rupture. Without some sort of traditional roots conservatism lacks
any absolute orientation of its own. It is simply the politics of inertia,
doggedly opposed to the politics of progress and enlightened ideals
(liberty, equality, fraternity etc). But if it has some sort of traditional
roots, then it has an ideal. This ideal is not an abstract ideal, taken
from the books of philosophers, but is the ideal of an interrupted con-
tinuity, the ideal of the agewhichwas in full possession of its traditions
before the rupture.
Let me state this:
Conservatism denies the rupture: it denies the enlightened ideals
which justified the establishment of the order following the
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rupture, and seeks to return, in imagination, but also as a practical
orientation, to the unenlightened ideals of the older order.
Here, perhaps, we should only talk of specifics. Each culture which
has its own word for ‘conservatism’ will have its own rupture and
its own traditions which were sundered by the rupture. But general-
isations are possible. Anthropologically speaking, what existed before
the enlightenment everywhere amounts to, I think, though of course




I have thought about these three things at some length, but do not
have time to defend their choice here: I can only hope that they
should seem evidently plausible candidates for what I am talking
about. By sacrality I mean that there was an established cult or
church, and that the entire social and political order was inseparable
from the divine, so that the king was, in some sense or other, the
monarch because of divine right or grace. By hierarchy I mean that
there were hierarchies running from the king at the top through
lords, priests, jurists, soldiers, merchants and so on down to the pea-
sants: and that these were embedded in the system, so the social order
was the same thing as these structures of hierarchy. The only external
means of assessing the order was the one supplied by religion. By spe-
cificity I mean that every institution originated out of a specific
response to a specific problem. There were, no doubt, attempts to
impose uniformity, whether under the banner of sacrality, or
because of the decision of someone higher up in the hierarchy, but
there was never an attempt to impose a deliberate uniformity on the
body politic in terms of some abstract or universal principle.





In this sense, then, conservatism is not only opposed to the progres-
sive or enlightened policies now, in so far as they threaten the estab-
lished order; it is also opposed to the progressive or enlightened ideals
of secularity, equality and generality in toto, and in favour of a restor-
ation, were it ever possible – which it might never be – of sacrality,
hierarchy and specificity. I wrote in my essay on ‘The
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Contradictions of Conservatism’ that the symbol of this sort of reac-
tionary-radical conservatism might be the divine monarch. I am not
so sure that conservatism should be reduced to something as particu-
lar as this (even though the idea of a divine monarch seems fairly ubi-
quitous around the world until the eighteenth century, and even cast
a shadow over the Greek polis and Renaissance respublica): nonethe-
less, it could be taken as a symbol for such old orders.
So:
This means that conservatism is at this stage wholly opposed to the
enlightened ideals of secularity, equality and generality and holds
onto the unenlightened ideals of sacrality, hierarchy and specificity
– however difficult it is to apply these in an enlightened political
order.
7.
The argument of this paper is that conservatism can only be defined if
we define it dialectically, in such a way that we can incorporate its
contradictions into one definition. As should be evident, I think
this is possible, and here it is, adding the numbers 1, 2, 3 to make
absolutely clear the different stages of the dialectic:
1. Conservatism is holding onto what we have,
where what we have is of the past as well as of the present,
in a historical situation in which there has been a rupture
with the past,
and where the rupture has involved the arrival of rational,
secular ideals.
Conservatism involves 2. an acceptance of the rupture;
but 3. it also involves a denial of the rupture.
2.Conservatism accepts the rupture, and therefore tacitly accepts the
enlightened ideals which justified the rupture; however, in its
practical politics, it attempts to hold onto as much of the
status quo as possible, and this means opposing the parties
which are in favour of a politics carried out in terms of the
same enlightened ideals and which in the name of those
ideals favour further reform or revolution.
This means that conservatism may become enlightened in conserv-
ing a status quo which is itself built out of the enlightened
ideals of an earlier generation of non-conservatives.
3. Conservatism denies the rupture: it denies the enlightened ideals
which justified the establishment of the order following the
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rupture, and seeks to return, in imagination, but also as a
practical orientation, to the unenlightened ideals of the
older order.
This means that conservatism is at this stage wholly opposed to
the enlightened ideals of secularity, equality and generality
and holds onto the unenlightened ideals of sacrality, hier-
archy and specificity – however difficult it is to apply these
in an enlightened political order.
This is, I hope, a refutation of the Oakeshottian, or minimal, defin-
ition of conservatismwhich, it should be obvious, narrows down con-
servatism to the first line only of this dialectical definition. Note that
this is a refutation not by contradiction, but a refutation by extension
– to include contradiction. It is perhaps worth saying again that I am
not arguing that Oakeshott is wrong: only that his view of conserva-
tism was minimal to a fault. It can be used, and is used, by advocates
of conservatism who want to make conservatism sound like the most
natural thing in the world – which, of course, at the first stage of its
dialectic, it is – but apart from this rather sly, apparently neutral
but actually polemical, use, it cannot be justified. It excludes too
much. And it makes conservatism unexceptional. It might be of pol-
itical advantage to make an objectionable position seem less objec-
tionable than it really is, but it is of little philosophical value. A
minimal definition simply does not enable us to understand
conservatism.
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